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The objective of the study was to determine the firm value creating 
outcomes arising from institutional shareholder engagement in Kenya.  
The study used data from a sample of 117 institutional investors in the 
Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya, selected using stratified simple 
random sampling technique.  
The study established that the shareholder engagement outcome that 
significantly explains firm value creation is improvement of a firm’s 
system of governance, which includes boards of directors that have 
independent, equitable and minority representation. 
The study contributes to literature on shareholder engagement from a 
Kenyan perspective and adds an impetus to investors, management and 
policymakers to address issues that are impeding shareholder engagement 
given its effect on governance and value of the firm. The study 
recommends that firms invest in improvement in governance structures, 
and policymakers are advised to maintain an updated register of all the 
institutional investors, including their current contacts, and a Kenya-
specific central depository of data on engagement actions and outcomes 
across listed companies.  
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Investors are interested in maximizing their wealth, through maximizing the value of the firms they invest in. Value 
is created when the synergy from managerial effort and utilisation of assets generates returns that are higher than 
the required rate of return for the investment class, over a long planning horizon (Arnold, 2013). Shareholders can 
take certain actions to achieve outcomes that would positively influence managerial effort and management 
decision making towards value adding initiatives. Misalignments have been noted on dividends, where management 
may prefer payments in the short term while shareholders may prefer reinvesting of the same to create long-term 
value (Derrien, Ambrus, & Thesmar, 2013). Similar disparities exist on views on long-term sustainability, strategy 
alignment, and concurrence on project selection. 
 





Debate is divided on whether involvement of shareholders and their engagement with the management of their 
companies is beneficial to the firm (Gillan & Starks, 2007; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Ho, 2010; Ingley et al., 2011). 
Proponents argue that engagement leads to a better understanding and cooperation, which adds to the firm’s value; 
it aligns the expectations of both the board and shareholders, thereby averting unnecessary unexpected 
consequences such as negative votes on proposals; aligns the interests of investors with bondholders by addressing 
management entrenchment problems; and helps management to provide detailed information on its long-term 
strategy to shareholders, who may be concerned with cyclic short-term performance challenges (Ho, 2010; Kim & 
Schloetzer, 2013; Sunder, Sunder, & Wongsunwai, 2014).  
 
On the other hand, Kim and Schloetzer (2013) report that engagement is a complex and risky process, that is costly 
and time-consuming for management; is likely to send uncoordinated and inconsistent messages and signals from 
several distinct engagements; is unlikely to accommodate the variety of shareholder interests and expectations 
causing disappointments; and may face legal challenges of unfair provision of market-sensitive information to 
selected engagers at the expense of other market players. Goranova and Ryan (2014) also argue that shareholder 
engagement may just compound managerial self-interest with shareholder self-interest. As observed by Bratton and 
Wachter (2010), the U.S. mortgage crisis may have been fanned by shareholders who encouraged management 
towards managing-to-market strategies, rewarding them with generous compensation for their high-risk, high-return 
strategies that gave shareholders short-term wealth. Bebchuk et al. (2015) however suggest, based on their recent 
work, that claims of negative effects of hedge funds activism on long-term firm value are not only not supported by 
empirical data, but that activism actually contributes to improved performance.  
 
Other engagement supporters have observed that shareholders are the providers of capital, the ultimate risk takers, 
and as the residual claimants. Therefore, they need to be involved to reduce the residual loss (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Opponents, however, counter that investors are not the owners of companies, but mere renters, with rights to 
claim value based on their limited liability (McNulty & Nordberg, 2016), but not to take decisions, which are best 
left to professional managers (Bratton & Wachter, 2010; Donald, 2005). While this may be true of short-term 
investors interested in trading in shares, there are those with a long-term view of the company, seeking growth and 
stability, who require recognition and engagement (Clark & Hebb, 2004; Donald, 2005).  
 
Indeed, contrary to Berle and Means (1932), with a separation of ownership and control arising from shareholder 
power dispersal, pension funds with their wide beneficiary base are observed to play a role in aggregating dispersed 
owners and being active in the management of the companies they invest in. This is meant to drive firm 
fundamentals and secure their long-term value (Clark & Hebb, 2004). In the U.K., Becht et al. (2009) report a 
positive relationship between shareholder engagement and stock returns of investee companies, but also note that 
doubts have been expressed on the marginal value of the much-discussed engagement by the pension fund 
CalPERS and others within the U.S. by several scholars. 
 
A further challenge arises with respect to measuring value created from shareholder engagement. While value of 
firms has been measured variously using different accounting metrics such as Tobin’s Q, Return on Assets (ROA), 
Return on Equity (ROE) and other such measures, scholars have however highlighted the difficulty of measuring 
effects of shareholder engagement on the performance of a firm, especially when part of it takes the form of 
behind-the-scenes negotiations, using efforts that are not publicly documented (Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 
2009; Black & Coffee Jr., 1994; Crespi & Renneboog, 2010; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; McCahery, Sautner, & 
Starks, 2016). It is observed, for example, that it was only in exceptional circumstances that Becht et al. (2009) 
studied the effects of engagement by an active fund manager with its investee companies, using its unique dataset 
and reported higher than market returns arising from what they described as otherwise unobservable private 
engagements.  
 
This study recognises the challenge of attempting to measure value arising from such engagement, especially when 
studying several heterogeneous investors, with varied portfolios, and no publicly available data. Accordingly, the 
study attempted to find or create a measure of this influence of shareholder engagement over managerial effort, 











2. Literature Review 
The study was carried out against the backcloth of the Shareholder theory of the firm which defines the motivations 
of shareholders as being to maximize economic value (Pfarrer, 2010), and on agency theory which highlights the 
asymmetric relationship between shareholders and their agents ((Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
Scholars have identified several outcomes arising engagement actions. McCahery et al. (2016) identified the main 
outcomes which include improved governance, appointment of effective boards, alignment of shareholders’ and 
management objectives on dividends and long-term sustainability, strategy alignment, and concurrence on project 
selection. Other outcomes include change of ineffective management, improved corporate reputation, and adequacy 
of management compensation. These are expected to contribute to improved values of their portfolios, and 
reduction in waste (Bach & Metzger, 2015; Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang, 2015; Brav, Jiang, & Kim, 2015; Ingley, 
Mueller, & Cocks, 2011; Isaksson & Çelik, 2013; McCahery et al., 2016).  
 
One of the outcomes that has been highlighted is the appointment of boards of directors. Gillan and Starks (2007) 
observe that while shareholders may appoint boards of directors with a fiduciary responsibility to hire, fire, and 
monitor the managers, their failure triggers shareholder activism and engagement. The board represents the 
interface between investors and management, and is highlighted as the most important institution in corporate 
governance (Capital Markets Authority, 2015).  Effectiveness of the boards is dependent on having optimal board 
sizes, independence and non-affiliation to management (Giráldez & Hurtado, 2014; Judge, Gaur, & Muller-Kahle, 
2010; Pascual-Fuster & Crespi-Cladera, 2015; Schooley, Renner, & Allen, 2010). 
 
Giráldez and Hurtado (2014) observed that boards were appointed by shareholders to provide long-term strategic 
direction on companies, to oversee and monitor the executive management thereby reducing opportunism, and to 
act as the liaison between the owners and managers, thus enhancing communication. They have the unique 
responsibility of setting the tone at the top (Hunton, Hoitash, & Thibodeau, 2011). If the ethical issues of 
monitoring and communication are done properly, as Giráldez and Hurtado (2014) observe, the result is to increase 
or protect the value of the firm.  
 
Judge et al. (2010) observed that board size and independence contribute to board effectiveness in monitoring, 
while La Porta et al. (2000) posit that equitable investor representation is related to the value of stocks. Jensen 
(1993) observed that board sizes beyond seven to eight people provide an opportunity for control by management, 
while Ocasio (1994) argues that larger boards generate political coalitions that are able to challenge and control 
management (as cited in Zona, Zattoni, & Minichilli, 2013). Furthermore, Giráldez and Hurtado (2014) advocate 
for an optimal board size, noting that larger board sizes while bringing in variety of experience and expertise could 
also stifle decision making; they suggest board size can be measured using the number of directors. 
 
Boards represent the interests of investors, while ensuring the overall goals of the firm are not compromised by the 
several individual and often divergent investor interests (Celik & Isaksson, 2013). La Porta et al. (2000) reports that 
where investor protection includes minority representation on the boards, stock values have been noted to 
appreciate, but the minorities could also extract private benefits and distort long-term investment strategies to the 
detriment of firms (Belloc, 2013). Boards must also balance between representing their appointing investors’ 
interests, and ensuring the overall goals of the firm are not compromised by the several individual and often 
divergent investor interests (Celik & Isaksson, 2013). 
 
Literature supports the hypothesis that independence of directors is positively related to value (Giráldez & Hurtado, 
2014; Judge et al., 2010; Laux & Mittendorf, 2011). In this regard, Giráldez and Hurtado (2014) report that the 
association between board size and firm value is improved by the moderating effect of the presence of board 
independence. Giráldez argued that while self-interest and a desire to demonstrate achieving shareholder 
expectations, and incentives for earning managerial rewards, could lead to unethical behaviour by management, this 
is best controlled through a combination of a limited number of independent directors in the boards and 
strengthening of the ethical dimensions of management.  
 
Similarly, Judge et al. (2010) studied the antecedents of shareholder activism in target firms spread over different 
legal systems, and among other findings reported that prior studies had observed that independent boards that had a 
majority of outside directors were more effective in controlling management. This is supported by Schooley et al. 





(2010) on the importance of board composition, including independent directors and leadership. Hunton et al. 
(2011) however argues that where chief executives have more power than board members, it can present an agency 
problem. Evidence also suggests that when independent board members are not appropriately qualified for the task, 
they have not always helped the situation (Wong, 2011). 
 
3. Research Methodology 
This adopted a descriptive correlational research design. The population of the study consisted of 166 institutional 
investors in listed firms at the Nairobi Securities Exchange as of September 2016, and a sample size of 117 using 
stratified random sampling. The study used, to the extent applicable, a modification of a recently-used 
questionnaire in a study involving shareholder engagement by institutional investors (McCahery et al., 2016), with 
the kind permission of one of the authors. The questionnaire was modified to include variables and issues not 
included in the McCahery et al. (2016) study. The data was then analyzed using descriptive statistics of frequency 
and percentage distribution, mean, mode and median and inferential data analysis methods, which included factor 
analysis. 
 
4. Analysis and Findings 
The firm value creating outcomes in the study were measured using four variables. The variables sought to measure 
the observed outcomes as a result of previous shareholder engagement, the importance of the engagement outcomes 
to value of the firm, board of directors as a value creating outcome, and the preferred board size. Table 1 below 
summarizes the outcomes that were observed as having resulted from previous shareholder engagement.  
 
Table 1: Observed Shareholder Engagement Outcomes 
 
Engagement Outcomes Frequency Percentage 
Appointment of effective board of directors 58 74% 
Change of ineffective management 53 68% 
Change of company strategy 60 77% 
Alignment of the shareholders’ and management 
objectives on dividends 
60 77% 
Alignment of the shareholders’ and management 
objectives on long-term sustainability 
66 85% 
Appropriate projects selection to create value 51 65% 
Reduction in wasteful expenditure 61 78% 
Improved governance 68 87% 
Improved portfolio or firm value due to the engagement 50 64% 
Improved corporate reputation 50 64% 
Adequacy of management compensation 43 55% 
 
The investors were asked to rank the outcomes in order of importance to the value of the firm, based on their 
experience and expertise. A summary of the importance of the engagement outcomes on the value of the firm was 
presented in Table 2. The question was measured on a scale of one to five, with one being not at all important and 
five being very important. The results indicated that all the outcomes had a modal score of 4 or 5, indicating that 
most respondents agree that they are important shareholder engagement outcomes to value of the firm. The mean 
scores indicated a wide statistical range among the responses received for these factors, necessitating further 
analysis. 
 
Table 2: Importance of Shareholder Engagement Outcomes to Value of the Firm 
 
 Shareholder engagement outcomes Mean Median Mode 
Appointment of effective board of directors 4.19 4.00 4 
Change of ineffective management 4.13 4.00 4 
Change of company strategy 3.71 4.00 5 






Alignment of shareholders’ and management 
objectives on dividends 
3.62 4.00 5 
Alignment of shareholders’ and management 
objectives on long-term sustainability 
4.01 4.00 4 
Appropriate projects selection to create value 3.90 4.00 4 
Reduction in wasteful expenditure 3.72 4.00 4 
Improved governance 3.80 4.00 4 
Improved portfolio or firm value due to the 
engagement 
3.86 4.00 5 
Improved corporate reputation 3.33 4.00 4 
 
The third variable sought to measure the attitudes of the respondents towards various aspects of the board of 
directors as a value creating outcome on a scale of one to five, with one being strongly disagree and five being 
strongly agree. The results in Table 3 indicate the mean score for equitable representation of all shareholders on the 
board and minority shareholders who should be represented in the board was 4, which means that most of the 
respondents agreed with the statements with relation to the board of directors as a value creating outcome. On the 
others, most of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statements.   
 
Table 3: Board of Directors as a Value Creating Outcome 
 
  Mean Median Mode 
The size of the board of directors affects its effectiveness 3.16 3.00 3 
Having independent (outsider) directors in the board improves 
decision making 
3.51 4.00 3 
Independent directors protect shareholders interests and 
control over management 
3.34 3.00 3 
There should be equitable representation of all shareholders on 
the board 
3.58 4.00 4 
Minority shareholders should be represented in the Board 3.56 4.00 4 
 
The fourth objective sought to determine the appropriate board size as preferred by the shareholders. The summary 
presented in Table 4 shows that most of the respondents indicated their preferred board size would be 6 to 8 at 
37.3%, while 28% of the respondents indicated a preferred board size of 8 to 10. However, 8% of the respondents 
noted that their preferred board size would at most be 6, while 6.7% indicated an appropriate board size of 10 to 12. 
Up to 20% of the respondents indicated that the board size did not matter. 
 
Table 4: Preferred Board Size 
 
Preferred Board Size Frequency Percentage 
At most 6 6 8.0% 
6 to 8 28 37.3% 
8 to 10 21 28.0% 
10 to 12 5 6.7% 
Board size does not matter 15 20.0% 
Total 75 100.0% 
 
Table 5 below shows the suitability of the data for carrying out factor analysis on the importance of shareholder 
engagement outcomes in creating firm value using the KMO test and Bartlett’s test of sphericity that tests for 
sampling adequacy. The KMO statistic is between 0 and 1 and the closer it is to 1, the better the data is for factor 
analysis. The KMO statistic of 0.88 is supported by the significant Barlett’s test statistic at 95% confidence, hence 
the conclusion that the data can support factor analysis.  
 





Table 5: KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity on Value Variables 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.88 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 601.249 
 
Df 45 
 Sig. 0.000 
 
The dimension reduction showed that improved governance had the highest factor loading as an engagement 
outcome that creates value for the firm as illustrated by the component matrix Table 6. The factor loading for the 
appointment of an effective board of directors as a value enhancing outcome of shareholder engagement was 
however 0.792 and was ranked seventh in comparison to 10 shareholder engagement outcomes. 
 
Table 6: Factor Analysis on Value Creating Outcomes 
 
Factor Factor Loading 
Improved governance .912 
Appropriate projects selection to create value .896 
Change of company strategy .896 
Reduction in wasteful expenditure .847 
Alignment of shareholders’ and management objectives on long-term 
sustainability .821 
Change of ineffective management .801 
Appointment of effective board of directors .792 
Adequacy of management compensation .744 
Improved corporate reputation .705 
Alignment of shareholders’ and management objectives on dividends .426 
 
Factor analysis was carried out on the board of directors as a value creating outcome of shareholder engagement to 
identify which factor of a board of directors was ranked highly in relation to the others. Table 7 below displays the 
KMO and Bartlett’s statistic indicating the suitability of the data in carrying out factor analysis. The results 
indicated a KMO statistic of 0.771 supported by a significant Bartlett’s test statistic at 95% confidence level.  
 
Table 7: KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity on Directors 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.771 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 156.409 
 
df 10 
  Sig. 0.000 
 
An inspection of the component matrix in Table 8 showed that having independent (outsider) directors in the board 
improves decision making, ranked first with a factor loading of 0.912, while the second and third factor, 
independent directors protect shareholders’ interests and minority shareholders should be represented in the board, 
are tied with a factor loading of 0.896. Equitable representation of all shareholders on the board has a factor loading 
of 0.847, while the question whether the size of the board of directors affects its effectiveness trails at 0.517, 
indicating it was not a major contributing factor. 
 




Having independent directors in the board improves decision making .912 
Independent directors protect shareholders interests and control over management  
.896 






Minority shareholders should be represented in the board .896 
There should be equitable representation of all shareholders on the board .847 
The size of the board of directors affects its effectiveness .517 
 
5. Discussion of Results  
The study was cognisant of the difficulty of determining an appropriate measure of value of the firm that would be 
attributable to shareholder engagement actions, especially when studying several heterogeneous investors, with 
varied portfolios, and no publicly-available data. Following McCahery et al. (2016), this study therefore measured 
value created from the responses by investors, as to what extent they believed their actions had resulted in value 
creating outcomes.  
 
The study confirmed that the respondents had engaged and observed one or more outcomes. It identifies improved 
corporate governance as the most important engagement outcome that leads to enhancing the value of the firm. The 
findings of the study concurs with the findings of McCahery et al. (2016) who found that corporate governance 
affects the financial performance of a firm, and  that change of company strategy is among the main factors that 
enhance the value of a firm. It agrees with Arnold (2013) who noted that investors are interested in maximizing 
their wealth, through maximizing the value of the firms they invest in. The finding on alignment of shareholders’ 
and management objectives on long-term sustainability is also in tandem with the observation by Arnold (2013) 
that value is created when the synergy from managerial effort and utilisation of assets generates returns that are 
higher than the required rate of return for the investment class, over a long planning horizon. The study also found 
that respondents had observed that reduction in wasteful expenditure enhances the value of the firm, and also 
considered it important. The study thus agrees with the findings of Goranova and Ryan (2014), who asserted that 
shareholders take voice and exit actions to influence managerial effort and management decision making towards 
value adding initiatives.  
 
On the matter of boards of directors, the study showed appointment of an effective board of directors was not 
considered a very important factor in creating value for the firm, having been ranked seventh, after improved 
governance. This contradicts earlier observations on the importance of the board. Giráldez and Hurtado (2014) had 
observed that the board represents the interface between investors and management and its members are appointed 
by shareholders to provide long-term strategic direction for companies, to oversee and monitor the executive 
management and thereby reducing opportunism, and to act as the liaison between the owners and managers and 
thus enhance communication. If the ethical issues of monitoring and communication are done properly, as Giráldez 
and Hurtado (2014) observe, the result is to increase or protect the value of the firm. Boards are also highlighted as 
the most important institution in corporate governance (Capital Markets Authority, 2015). The respondents chose 
improved governance as the most important outcome, and this may have clouded their choice on effective boards, 
especially given their responses on what they considered as effective boards. It appears therefore that appointment 
of effective boards on its own was not ranked high, but considered as an integral part of improvement in 
governance. 
 
The study found having independent (outsider) directors in the board improves decision making. Other rankings 
included, in descending order: Independent directors protect shareholder interests, minority shareholders should be 
represented in the board, there is a need for equitable representation of all shareholders on the board, and lastly, the 
size of the board of directors affects its effectiveness. The study further reports that the appropriate board sizes are 
between six and 10 members. The finding of this study echoes the findings of Judge et al. (2010) who observed that 
the board size and its independence contribute to board effectiveness in monitoring, and with La Porta et al. (2000) 
who posit that equitable investor representation is related to the value of stocks. It accords with Giráldez and 
Hurtado (2014), who advocate for an optimal board size.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The study concludes that improvement of a firm’s system of governance, which includes boards of directors that 
have independent, equitable and minority representation, is the outcome that significantly explains firm value 
creation arising from shareholder engagement.  
 





7. Suggestions for Improvement 
The study recommends that firms invest in improvement in governance structures, which includes effective boards 
that have independent, equitable, and minority representation, and preferably with a size of between six and ten 
directors. This will ensure alignment of shareholders and management objectives on long-term sustainability, 
reduction in wasteful expenditure, change of company strategy, and other outcomes that drive firm value creation. 
 
8. Suggestions for Further Research 
The study initially set out to investigate the effect of shareholder engagement on the value of the firm in Kenya but 
was limited to assessing the effects of engagement on only value creating outcomes. This was due to the challenges 
of determining an appropriate measure of value of the firm that would be attributable to shareholder engagement 
actions, especially when studying several heterogeneous investors, with varied portfolios, and no publicly available 
data. It is recommended that further research be carried out on specific firms to establish relationships between 
documented as well as behind-the-scenes engagement actions over time and changes in value of the firms using 
conventional value metrics. This could be done using case study approaches or experimental methods, with the 
treatment being the engagement actions. 
 
The study also found there is limited, if any, publicly-available data on engagement. This study recommends 
research on the development of a Kenya-specific central depository of data on engagement actions and outcomes 
across listed companies, borrowing from best practices in the U.S. and U.K. This will facilitate efficiency and 
effectiveness in future research as engagement becomes embraced in the country and the region. 
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